Ethical Psychological Warfare Guide - Source Excerpt 03 - The Threshold of Attack and the Recognition of Mental Harm
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While the Just War tradition provides the philosophical underpinning for ethical conflict, International Humanitarian Law (IHL)—primarily encompassing the comprehensive frameworks of the Hague and Geneva Conventions—provides the binding, codified legal architecture that translates these moral principles into actionable rules of engagement.16 IHL fundamentally treats the existence of an armed conflict as a reality and seeks to carefully balance the harsh requirements of military necessity against the unyielding imperatives of human dignity.26 Although IHL was historically drafted to regulate kinetic violence, its provisions apply with equal legal force to the planning and execution of operations in the modern information environment.29
### **The Threshold of Attack and the Recognition of Mental Harm**
A central, ongoing debate in the application of IHL to psychological and cyber warfare is determining precisely when an information operation meets the legal threshold of an "attack." Under Article 49 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, an attack is strictly defined as an "act of violence against the adversary".30 To apply this to non-kinetic operations, legal scholars and military manuals generally utilize an effects-based approach: if a psychological, digital, or cyber operation can be reasonably expected to result in physical injury, death, or the physical destruction of objects, it unequivocally qualifies as an attack.30 Consequently, it becomes subject to the strict IHL rules governing the conduct of hostilities, including the principles of distinction, proportionality, and the requirement to take all feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm.30
Crucially, modern interpretations of IHL increasingly recognize that the definition of "injury" extends far beyond visible physical wounds. The International Committee of the Red Cross and leading legal scholars assert that if an information operation intentionally or incidentally induces severe mental suffering, trauma, or serious psychological illness—such as severe post-traumatic stress, clinical depression, or psychosis—it may be legally classified as causing injury.30 IHL treaties inherently protect mental health; for instance, the requirement to protect the "wounded and sick" encompasses those requiring medical care due to profound psychological trauma, extending strengthened legal protections to these individuals.32 Furthermore, physical brain injuries caused by blasts, which result in severe cognitive and psychological symptoms, are undeniably recognized as incidental injuries within proportionality calculations.33 However, establishing a definitive, evidentiary causal nexus between the dissemination of a deceptive digital narrative and a specific psychiatric injury in a civilian population remains a monumental legal challenge, creating vast, unresolved grey zones in the regulation of cognitive operations.31
### **Explicit Prohibitions and Protections in the Information Space**
Despite the complexities surrounding the definition of an attack, IHL establishes explicit, non-negotiable red lines that absolutely prohibit specific types of information operations, prioritizing the protection of life and human dignity above all military utility.25
Firstly, it is a fundamental violation of IHL to utilize psychological operations to encourage, order, or incite combatants, civilians, or proxy groups to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, or acts of genocide.25 This strict prohibition encompasses the dissemination of narratives that systematically dehumanize an adversary or a specific civilian demographic to lower the psychological barrier to mass violence.30 Furthermore, using digital platforms or messaging applications to encourage direct violence against protected civilians, civilian infrastructure, or wounded and detained enemy soldiers is explicitly unlawful.25
Secondly, IHL strictly prohibits operations designed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.25 While conventional, lawful bombardment may inevitably and incidentally cause profound fear among nearby populations, deliberately hacking into civilian communication networks to broadcast false air raid sirens, solely to keep inhabitants in a state of paralyzing terror or to cause unlawful mass displacement, is a direct violation of international law.25 Additionally, it is absolutely prohibited for belligerents to utilize information operations to declare that "no quarter" will be given—meaning that no enemy surrender will be accepted and all opposing forces will be annihilated.25 Threatening captured or wounded soldiers with torture, rape, or execution through psychological messaging is similarly prohibited.25
Thirdly, information operations must never amount to inhumane treatment or outrages upon personal dignity.30 This principle is particularly critical regarding the treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) and civilian internees. Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention explicitly and unconditionally protects POWs from "insults and public curiosity".25 In the context of modern digital warfare, this translates to a strict, unambiguous prohibition on publishing identifying information, photographs, videos, recordings of private conversations, or coercive interrogations of captured personnel.25 Exposing prisoners to global digital audiences for propaganda purposes violates their inherent dignity and exposes them and their families to demonization and potential harm.25
Finally, it is fundamentally unlawful to conduct information operations that undermine, target, or harm medical and humanitarian personnel.25 Spreading deliberate disinformation regarding the location, nature, or neutrality of humanitarian organizations in order to disrupt their access to vulnerable populations, erode local trust, or incite violence against aid workers is a severe violation of the obligation to respect and protect impartial relief operations.25
### **The Ethical Demarcation: Ruses of War vs. Perfidy**
The distinction between a lawful, expected military deception and an unlawful, treacherous betrayal of trust is arguably the most critical ethical and legal line drawn by IHL in the context of psychological and tactical operations.
**Ruses of War** are explicitly permitted under customary IHL and are codified in Article 37 of Additional Protocol I.30 These encompass acts intended to confuse or mislead the adversary, or to induce them to act recklessly, provided such acts do not infringe upon other rules of international law.30 Lawful ruses include the use of visual camouflage, the deployment of decoys, the transmission of false communication signals, the execution of mock operations or feints, and the dissemination of tactical misinformation explicitly designed to undermine an adversary's military discipline, misdirect their reconnaissance assets, or weaken their will to resist.25
**Perfidy**, conversely, is strictly prohibited and constitutes a grave war crime if it results in the killing, injuring, or capturing of an adversary.30 Additional Protocol I defines perfidy as acts that invite the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of IHL, with the specific intent to betray that confidence.30 The essence of perfidy is the malicious abuse of good faith. Examples include feigning a desire to surrender under a flag of truce in order to draw enemy forces into an ambush, feigning incapacitation by wounds or sickness to launch a surprise attack, or feigning protected civilian, medical, or neutral status.30 The absolute prohibition on perfidy is vital because it preserves the minimal "good faith" between belligerents that is absolutely necessary to allow for safe surrender, the treatment of the wounded, and the eventual restoration of peace; without this trust, warfare descends into an inescapable cycle of limitless savagery.38
It is important to note the nuances of protected status within IHL, particularly concerning the concept of the *Levée en Masse*. Recognized since the 19th century and codified in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, a *Levée en Masse* occurs when the inhabitants of a non-occupied territory spontaneously take up arms on the approach of the enemy to resist invading forces, without having had time to form regular armed units.41 If these civilians carry arms openly and respect the laws of war, they are entitled to combatant status and POW protections.41 As demonstrated during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, civilians participating in a genuine *Levée en Masse* are acting lawfully; their participation does not constitute perfidy, provided they do not simultaneously attempt to feign non-combatant status while engaging in hostilities.41